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TRANSFORMATION OF TOURISM AND HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY 
IN MACEDONIA 
 
Abstract  
In this paper, we address the problem of transformation of the tourism and hospitality industry in 
Macedonia. Despite the stable macroeconomic environment and the progress in the privatization 
process, the so called "transition recession" in the tourism and hospitality industry is still present. The 
post-privatization experience shows that the insider-oriented privatization has negative impact on the 
corporate governance and post-privatization financing and therefore, it seems to be the most important 
constraint in the restructuring of the privatized enterprises. 
Keywords: Transition recession; Insider-privatization; Corporate governance; Post-privatization 
finance; Enterprise restructuring. 
 
Introduction 
Like all ex-communist countries, Macedonia saw a sharp decline in its economic activity 
during the transition to a market economy. The tourism and hospitality industry was also 
affected by the transformation recession although the output decline was slightly lesser 
compared to the economy as a whole. During 1991-95, the average annual growth rate of the 
real GDP in the tourism and hospitality was -7.3% while the whole economy was shrinking 
by an average annual rate of 8.6% (Statistical Office, 1997). 
Yet, it is note-worthy that the negative tendencies in the tourism and hospitality industry were 
evident even before the transition process commenced. For example, between 1989 and 1992, 
the number of tourists and overnights dropped by 43% and 39% respectively. At the same 
time, the real GDP generated in the tourism and hospitality fell by 22% followed by a 18% 
decrease in the number of employees (Statistical Office, 1996). This may lead to a conclusion 
that the recession cannot be related exclusively to the transition process which is true, since 
the sharp decline during the pre-transition period is due to the turbulent events from the early 
1990s (the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia, external blockades, hyperinflation etc.). 
Obviously, these shocks had a strong negative impact on the foreign as well as the domestic 
demand and therefore they appear to be a primary driving force behind the decline of the 
tourism and hospitality industry in the pre-transition period. But, despite this fact, it should be 
noted that the recession was prolonged beyond 1992 in contrast with the progress achieved in 
the macroeconomic stability and the near-completion of the privatization process. 
 
Table 1 
Basic development indicators of tourism and hospitality in Macedonia 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
GDP1 8.887 8.651 7.696 8.081 8.485 
Turnover2 -835.6% 189.4% 13.6% -13.6% -2.8% 
Overnights3 2.139.631 2.706.373 2.476.998 1.784.310 1.696.927 
Tourists3    585.699    647.728    615.134    503.837    476.205 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia (1996 and 1997); National Bank of the 
Republic of Macedonia (1998). 
Notes: 
1. In 1990 prices.  
2. Annual real growth rates. 
3. Total, foreign and domestic. 
 
 The statistical data presented above clearly indicate that there is something wrong with the 
reform process since there are no signs of strong recovering in the tourism and hospitality 
industry. In addition, we argue that the privatization model itself cannot lead to an effective 
restructuring of the enterprises, which in turn seems to be the main reason for the poor 
performance in this industry. 
 
The privatization process in tourism and hospitality 
Unlike most of the transition countries, which opted for mass privatization schemes, 
Macedonia has adopted the model of case-by-case privatization. The privatization process 
formally began in the middle of 1993 when the Parliament passed The Act on Transformation 
of Enterprises with Social Capital. The Act provides for several models of privatization: 
employee buy-out, management buy-out, sale of an ideal part of the company, privatization 
through additional share issue, debt-equity conversion, asset sell-off, leasing, liquidation etc. 
(Zakon za transformacija, 1993). 
Methods of Privatization 
However, in the practical implementation of the Law, the specific variants of EBOs and 
MBOs are by far predominant in terms of the number of enterprises and employees as well as 
the equity. In the first case, the employees are given the opportunity to buy out at least 51% of 
the appraised value of the enterprise under very favourable conditions (receiving large 
discounts and being able to pay the shares in five years, including a two-year grace period). In 
the second case, a group of natural persons (a management team) can obtain the right to 
control the enterprise by paying down only 10% or 20% of the appraised value, depending on 
the size of the enterprise. In addition, this privilege is balanced with the obligation to purchase 
at least 51% of the enterprise's shares in no more than five annual installments that are 
interest-free. The frequent use of this privatization method is especially favoured by the 
authorities who claim that it demonstrates a certain degree of ownership concentration with a 
positive impact on companies' efficiency (Agency of the Republic of Macedonia, 1996). 
Privatization results 
Initially, the privatization of tourism and hospitality enterprises represented only a small 
fraction of the entire privatization programme. Namely, at the beginning of the process, there 
were 70 enterprises to be privatized in this sector with 5.890 employees and DM 219 million-
worth of equity. Obviously, the privatization of the tourism and hospitality enterprises was a 
marginal question regarding the total number of 1.216 enterprises to be privatized with 
228.850 employees and worth some DM 3.3 billion. (Agencija na Republika Makedonija, 
1997). 
Although the actual implementation of privatization programme was prolonged to the 
beginning of 1995, the process progressed with an impressive pace, being almost completed 
by the end of 1997 when 1.132 enterprises (93% of the total) were formally privatized. In 
contrast with this progress, the privatization process in the tourism and hospitality has 
advanced rather slowly with only 56% of the total number of enterprises and 48% of the 
equity having been privatized. 
 
Table 2 
Privatization progress in the tourism and hospitality (end of December 1997) 
 
 Privatized In process To be privatized 
Number of enterprises 39 15 16 
Number of employees 2.498 2.589 803 
Equity (000 DM) 104.752 70.437 43.522 
   Source: Macedonian Privatization Agency (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Some negative consequences 
Since the passage of the Privatization Act in mid-1993, the Government officials have 
repeatedly praised the privatization process as successful and most suitable to the country's 
specific conditions. On the other hand, the Law has provoked a wide-spread criticism with 
regard to its negative impact on the pace of the reforms, corporate governance, capital market 
development, enterprise restructuring, business ethics and other areas of the country's 
economic and social development (see Slaveski, 1995). In this context, we also believe that 
the privatization model will adversely influence the further development of the tourism and 
hospitality industry in Macedonia. 
We have already noted that the privatization process in the tourism and hospitality lags behind 
the progress achieved in the overall implementation of the privatization programme. It may 
suggest that the insider-based privatization methods (EBOs and MBOs) which are most 
frequently practiced are not suitable means of privatizing the enterprises in this industry. 
Namely, most of them are large measured by the capital base (since fixed investments account 
for the most of their assets) and therefore they are costly to buy-out. In addition, the small 
labour force employed in these enterprises implies that the number of potential buyers is quite 
limited while the modest financial capacity of the employees (due to the permanently 
declining personal income) is another limiting factor. 
As the insider-oriented privatization methods obviously constrain the privatization process it 
will be necessary to supplement them with other techniques. In the absence of a mass-
privatization programme, it seems that sales to strategic domestic and foreign investors could 
speed up the privatization of tourism and hospitality enterprises, especially those which are 
actually or potentially profitable. In this context, the other transition countries' experience 
shows that sales to strategic investors proved to be a successful way of privatizing the hotel 
industry (IBRD, 1997). 
In addition, the experience shows that the insider-privatization encourages the emergence of 
internal interest groups, which struggle for control over enterprises. In some cases, a number 
of management teams compete to gain the control right which prolongs the privatization 
procedure with all the negative impact on the enterprise performance. This was the case with 
the privatization of HUNAP (a small enterprise with two hotels and 47 employees) where 
three management teams bid to buy-out the enterprise. The Privatization Agency signed a 
contract with one of the outside-teams and then, under the pressure of the insiders, it revoked 
the decision and signed a contract with the insider-team. In the meantime, the first 
management team initiated a lawsuit which temporarily suspended the privatization process 
(Dnevnik, 1998a). 
At the same time, there are widespread conflicts between managers and employees in the 
enterprises privatized through MBOs. Even the privatization authorities admit that it is a 
common practice that employees are often brutally forced, under the threat of being degraded 
or even dismissed, to transfer their shares to top managers at large discounts. Recently, a 
group of shareholders in Makedonija-Turist (a company privatized through MBO) initiated a 
legal action against some of the top-managers, accused to have their shares illegally acquired 
(Dnevnik, 1998b). 
 
The post-privatization restructuring 
In contrast to the early days of transition, nowadays there is a consensus that the privatization 
process by itself, although being a necessary precondition, does not ensure a higher level of 
economic efficiency. In addition, it is commonly accepted that privatized enterprises have to 
be effectively restructured in order to improve their behavior and hence, performance. 
With respect to enterprise restructuring, the first step is to impose financial discipline on the 
privatized firms by cutting direct government subsidies and opening markets to competition. 
It also requires removing two other sources of soft-budget constraints: bank credits on easy 
terms and interenterprise arrears (IBRD, 1996). Some of these conditions were met even in 
the pre-reform era when tourism and hospitality enterprises operated within relatively 
competitive environment and did not receive any direct budget subsidies. 
 In addition, the tight monetary policy and banking sector reform meant that non-viable 
enterprises had no longer access to cheap bank credits. Yet, with respect to the removal of 
inter-enterprise arrears, there is no significant improvement as both the lax legal regulations 
and inefficient courts enable many insolvent enterprises to avoid the bankruptcy procedure. 
This widespread financial non-discipline creates incentives for many non-viable enterprises 
not to undertake restructuring measures and at the same time, it has negative influence on the 
profitable ones. 
Alongside with the macroeconomic stability and legal regulations, the choice of the method of 
privatization has a significant impact on the enterprise restructuring. This choice appears to 
influence both the depth and the pace of restructuring (EBRD, 1995). Indeed, the behavior of 
the enterprises privatized through management-employees buy-outs in Macedonia has 
undoubtedly proven the negative influence of the insider-privatization. 
First of all, management-employees buy-outs did not improve the corporate governance in the 
privatized enterprises because it did not produce strong dominant shareholders who would be 
able to monitor the managers' behavior. Instead, they have resulted in a diluted ownership 
since even in MBOs, management teams consist of all company's employees (often, hundreds 
or even thousands of "managers"). In addition, insider-privatization methods have created 
another problem: they have put the employees in a conflict position because they appear both 
as shareholders and employees at the same time. In fact, this means a conservation of the old 
decision-making process inherited from the previous system (the so-called self-management) 
which proved to be extremely inefficient  (For the criticism of the self-management,  
see Sirc, 1994). 
Unsurprisingly, the weak corporate control mechanisms resulting from the insider-
privatization led to accumulation of excessive power in the hands of incumbent managers 
who usually used it to "strip" the enterprise's assets. In addition, diluted ownership structures 
enable the old incumbent managers to preserve their jobs in spite of the companies' bad 
performance. In fact, the privatization process did not bring any improvement in companies' 
management since the old managers simply do not know the modern management techniques. 
Finally, the employees' dual position often leads to the famous "Ward paradox" since they 
prefer their personal short term goals (maximization of wages) to the firm's long term goals 
(maximization of profits). As a consequence, the privatized enterprises continued with the 
behaviour inherited from the previous system. 
The post-privatization experience clearly showed that the bad financial condition of privatized 
enterprises seriously constrains their restructuring efforts. This means that the future 
restructuring results decisively depend on the mobilization of external finance. With respect 
to this, the experience shows that insider-privatization has extremely negative impact on the 
companies' ability to raise external funds in order to restructure. This negative impact comes 
from several reasons: 
First, despite their bad financial condition and the urgent need for funds for restructuring, the 
privatized enterprises are not keen on new issues of shares as it could impose a danger of 
upsetting the ownership structure by allowing outside investors to obtain a significant stake of 
shares and thus, influence the management. This is the main reason why the privatized 
enterprises have not applied yet for listing on the Macedonian Stock Exchange nor have they 
issued shares in order to raise capital. 
Second, enterprises which have chosen MBOs as a privatization method use the cash flows 
for repayment of the annual installments resulting from the privatization arrangements, thus 
being unable to pay dividends on the issued shares. This reduces the attractiveness of shares 
compared to the high-yielding bank deposits which seem to be a better investment alternative 
for small investors. 
Third, both wealthy individuals and domestic and foreign companies are not interested in 
investing in the privatized enterprises strongly controlled by insiders in which they would 
only have a minor role. 
Fourth, insider-dominated enterprises tend to oppose any public disclosure of information on 
their financial condition and business activity. This creates an information vacuum, which 
deters both individual and institutional investors from investing in these companies. 
 Although it is too early to assess the restructuring results of privatized enterprises, the 
available statistical data cannot indicate any significant improvement in the economic 
efficiency of these firms. 
 
Table 3 
Enterprise performance in tourism and hospitality 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Pre-tax profit per employee1 1.647 7.469 24.004 20.604 16.910 
Loss per employee1 2.215 14.318 21.570 33.446 46.517 
Return on equity2 1.1 1.4 3.4 2.6 2.1 
Loss/fix assets ratio n.a n.a 3.0 4.2 5.7 
Receivables/liabilities ratio 84.0 101.3 94.0 93.5 78.0 
Revenues/expenses ratio 99.0 98.0 102.0 98.1 95.1 
Debt/capital ratio n.a n.a 27.0 31.1 43.0 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Statistical Yearbook (Various issues). 
Notes: 
All figures are given in percentage points, except stated otherwise. 
1. In denars, non-adjusted for the inflation. 
2. Return means gross profit 
 
In fact, the restructuring efforts of privatized enterprises are of very limited scope and usually 
take form of "reactive" restructuring (e.g. labor-shedding, real wage reductions etc.). For 
example, between 1992 and 1996, the number of employees in the tourism and hospitality 
enterprises fell by 21% (Statistical Office, 1996). At the same time, real wage cuts were not 
so sharp as they decreased only by 2.4% between 1994 and 1996 (Statistical Office, 1997). 
This indicate that insiders in the privatized enterprises may have already begun to behave in 
line with the "Ward paradox", aiming to maximize wages per employee. 
With regard to the "strategic" restructuring, the privatized firms have not undertaken any 
significant measures. Experience shows that, due to the insider-privatization methods, most of 
the enterprises have preserved their old management teams, which have proved incapable to 
establish effective organizational structures, improve the product-mix and introduce new 
management techniques. Unsurprisingly, the privatized enterprises proved unable to 
compensate the loss of traditional markets (ex-Yugoslavia, Greece). On the contrary, the 
available statistical data suggest that the role of the western European market permanently 
diminishes. 
Furthermore, it is clear that privatized enterprises, faced with capital constraints, cannot 
achieve any significant results in the field of the "deeper" restructuring. As a result, new 
capital investment in the privatized enterprises permanently decreases while depreciation 
largely exceeds gross investment, thus leading to disinvestment with its devastating impact on 
the restructuring of these companies. 
 
Table 4 
Investment in tourism and hospitality 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Net investment1 -79.827 -163.167 -178.366 n.a 
Gross investment/GDP ratio 8% 3.8% 3% n.a 
Investment in fixed assets2 189.4% 13.6% -13.8% -2.8% 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia (1997); Own calculations. 
Notes: 
1. In thousands of denars, non-adjusted for the inflation. 
2. Annual real growth rates. 
 
 
 Conclusions 
Although it is too early to assess the results of the privatization process which takes place in 
Macedonia, there is no evidence that the privatized enterprises have improved their 
performances. Undoubtedly, external shocks related to the conflicts and unstable political 
situation in the region have a great impact on the tourism and hospitality development in 
Macedonia. In addition, the domestic tourism demand has 
been seriously affected by the transformation recession as well as the restrictive 
macroeconomic policy pursued by the Government which have resulted in declining real 
personal income of the population. 
At the same time, the privatization experience to-date has undoubtedly proven the negative 
impact of the insider-privatization methods on the restructuring of the tourism and hospitality 
industry. The insider-privatization hampers both the corporate governance of the privatized 
companies and their ability to attract external finance. As a result, the behavior of the 
privatized enterprises remained unchanged from the previous system and thus, their 
performances have not improved yet. 
In order to facilitate the privatization and restructuring of tourism and hospitality enterprises, 
it will be necessary to revise the present privatization programme. First of all, the 
Privatization Agency should prefer, whereever it is possible, sales to outside investors versus 
management and employees buy-outs as a method of privatization. This should be 
accompanied with more active role in the sale of the so-called "residual shares" (the Agency's 
portfolio of shares in privatized companies) under more favourable terms. Finally, the 
authorities should encourage the transfer of ownership rights in order to enhance the 
ownership concentration. 
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